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Abstract 
Several theories of conscious first described about a decade ago, including the 
conscious electromagnetic information (CEMI) field theory, claimed that the substrate 
of consciousness is the brain’s electromagnetic (EM) field. These theories were 
prompted by the observation, in many diverse systems, that synchronous neuronal 
firing, which generates coherent EM fields, was a strong correlate of attention, 
awareness and consciousness. However, when these theories were first described 
there was no direct evidence that synchronous firing was actually functional, rather 
than an epiphenomenon of brain function. Additionally, any EM field-based 
consciousness would be a ‘ghost in the machine’ unless the brain’s endogenous EM 
field is also able to influence neurone firing. Once again, when these theories were 
first described, there was only indirect evidence that the brain’s EM field influenced 
neuron firing patterns in the brain.  In this paper I describe recent experimental 
evidence which demonstrate that synchronous neuronal firing does indeed have a 
functional role in the brain; and also that brain’s endogenous EM field is involved in 
recruiting neurones to synchronously firing networks. The new data point to a new 
and unappreciated form of neural communication in the brain that is likely to have 
significance for all theories of consciousness. I describe an extension of the cemi field 
theory that incorporates these recent experimental findings and integrates the theory 
with the ‘communication through coherence’ hypothesis.  
 
Introduction: EM field theories of consciousness.  
The starting point for most EM field theories of consciousness is the increasing 
evidence that synchronous firing of neurones is a strong correlate of conscious 
perception. For instance, work in the early 1990’s by Wolf Singer and colleagues 
demonstrated that neurons in the monkey brain that responded to two independent 
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images of a bar on a screen fired asynchronously when the bars were moving in 
different directions but fired synchronously when the same bars moved together 
(Kreiter and Singer 1996). Interestingly, the same group demonstrated zero time lag 
between synchronously-firing areas of the brain (Roelfsema et al. 1997) severely 
constraining any model to account for synchrony based solely on neural/synaptic 
signal transmission from a common source (since transmission times are likely to be 
different).  Many additional studies confirmed and extended these findings to many 
different experimental systems (reviewed in my 2002 papers and several more recent 
reviews, for instance, (Singer 2011)). For instance, David Leopold’s laboratory at 
Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, in Tubingen, Germany (Wilke et al. 
2006) investigated awake monkeys trained to respond to a visual stimulus - the 
removal of a red dot from a target area – by pulling a lever (to receive their fruit juice 
reward). Once the monkeys had grasped this skill they were tested with trials of more 
complex visual fields that contained both red dots and a random array of white dots as 
distractions.  The red dot and its removal was still detected and encoded within the 
primary visual cortex of these monkeys but sometimes, they saw the dot’s removal 
and responded appropriately, and sometimes they missed it. The experiment is similar 
in many ways to binocular rivalry experiments but instead of two percepts competing 
for the same visual space; this experimental setup (known as generalized flash 
suppression  or GFS)  is more akin to the very familiar experience of failing (or not) 
to see an object in plain sight; but, using the monkey experimental system, the 
experimenters were able to simultaneously monitored neural activity in the monkey’s 
visual cortex. The researchers monitored both neuron spiking and changes in local 
field potentials in V1, V2 and V4 regions of the monkey’s visual cortex. They first 
demonstrated that spiking of neurons in cortical areas V1 and V2 was totally 
uncorrelated with the monkey’s perception of the target. Whether the monkeys saw 
the target or not did not appear to make any difference to neuron firing in these areas. 
This is entirely consistent with a large body of evidence that led Crick and Koch to 
propose that consciousness is not associated with the contents of the primary visual 
cortex (Crick and Koch 1992;Crick and Koch 1995). However, despite the fact that 
neuron firing in V1 and V2 didn’t correlate with perception; low frequency (alpha 
range, particularly 9–30 Hz) modulation of local field potentials in these same regions 
did correlate with perception! It seems that though the neuron firing rate in the 
primary visual cortex does not see the stimulus, the synchronicity of neuron firing, 
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which generates the local field potentials, does indeed see the target. The researchers 
also investigated gamma range (30–50 Hz) oscillations. Modulations in this frequency 
range did not correlate with perception in V1 and V2 but strongly correlated with 
perception in the V4 visual area. The results, taken together, suggest the relationship 
that synchrony per se is the key correlate of consciousness, rather than any 
requirement for synchrony at a particular frequency or within a particular region of 
the brain.   
Demonstrating that synchrony correlates with attention in experimental 
animals does not prove that it associated with consciousness, as the conscious state of 
animals remains unclear. However analogous studies in humans have been performed 
in conditions such as epilepsy when single electrode and multiple electrodes may be 
inserted into the brain of awake subjects. These procedures have allowed both single 
cell measurements and measurement of extracellular local field potentials in the 
human cortex together with the correlation of these measurements with attention, 
memory and perception. Just as in the animal studies, these rare and valuable studies 
provide strong evidence for assemblies of synchronously firing neurones areas in 
widely distributed regions of the brain to be strongly correlated with attention and 
awareness in humans (Engel et al. 2005).  
It is interesting to consider for a moment the implications of these findings 
taking, for an example, the familiar experience of failing to spot an object in plain 
sight. Take a look at Figure 1. Can you see an animal in the picture? You will I am 
sure soon spot the frog sitting in the centre of the picture. But what was happening in 
your brain before you spotted the frog. The visual information was imprinted on your 
retina and signals were sent to your visual cortex where they were processed through 
the firing of many thousands of neurones. But you weren’t aware that a subgroup of 
those firing neurones encoded the visual information corresponding to a frog. After 
some several seconds the frog pops out of the image. What happens to the neurones 
that previously recorded the visual information encoding the amphibian? Did they 
change their firing rate or amplitude? The answer is no. The firings rates and 
amplitudes of the relevant neurones remain unchanged by the conscious experience of 
attending to an image. The key mechanistic difference between unconscious and 
conscious information in the brain is not the presence or absence of firing in any 
particular neurone or region of the brain but a particular level of synchrony of firing 
between distantly separated neurones. Information that you are not aware of is 
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encoded in asynchronously firing neurones but when you become aware of that 
information those same neurones fire in synchrony. But why should this be? 
Synchronous firing is the most firmly established neural correlate of consciousness 
and the one that every scientific theory of consciousness needs to account for but its 
functional significance remains unclear and controversial. Many neurobiologists have 
proposed that synchronous firing binds the information in distant neurones into a 
single percept. But why is the information in synchronously firing neurones bound 
any more tightly that information in asynchronously firing neurones?  
Placing consciousness in the brain’s EM field naturally and elegantly accounts 
for why synchronous firing is correlated with conscious percepts. Nerve firing is 
caused by electrochemical signals travelling down (the action potential) and between 
(synaptic transmission) neurones. Neurones tend to fire in bursts generating 
oscillations at particular frequencies (Basar 1998;Basar 1999;Basar 2008;Buzsaki 
2006). These neuronal oscillations cause correlated perturbations of the EM field 
(primarily the electric field) both within and between neurones (Freeman 
1975;Freeman 2003;Nunez 2000). When neurones within a local group fire randomly 
then the peaks and troughs of their oscillations will be out of phase so that the 
resulting EM field disturbance will tend to sum to zero. However, if the neurones fire 
synchronously then the peaks and troughs of their oscillations will reinforce each 
other to generate a strong net EM field oscillation. It is these synchronous oscillations 
that are detected by measurement of local field potentials, EEG or MEG (though the 
precise source of either remains unclear) (Freeman 2003;Freeman 2011). So 
information encoded in asynchronously firing neurones will remain within the 
neurones and not be visible at the level of the brain’s EM field; whereas information 
in synchronously-firing neurones will be reflected into the brain’s EM field. Placing 
the seat of consciousness in the brain’s EM field naturally accounts for why its 
perturbations are correlated with attention and awareness. When the neurones 
encoding the frog’s form in Figure 1 were firing asynchronously then that information 
is not presented to the brain’s (conscious) EM field; but when those same neurones 
fire in phase then that same information is reflected into the brain’s EM field making 
you, the CEMI field of your brain, aware of the frog. 
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The CEMI theory1 has much in common with the EM field theory of 
consciousness proposed by Dr Susan Pockett in her book “The Nature of 
Consciousness: A Hypothesis” (Pockett 2000;Pockett 2002). The neurophysiologist E. 
Roy John also published a theory of consciousness involving EM fields (John 2002); 
and Fingelkurts and Finkelkurts published a theory of consciousness which is based 
on the interactions of EM fields (Fingelkurts et al. 2001;Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts 
2008). The key insight of each of these theories is the realisation that, as well as 
generating chemical signals that are communicated via conventional synapses, 
neurones may also generate an EM field and placing awareness in this field solves 
many of the most intractable problems of consciousness. 
 However, when these EM field theories of consciousness were published in 
2002 there remained only circumstantial evidence for two key aspects of these 
theories. Firstly, it was not established that assemblies of synchronously firing 
neurons have a functional role. Secondly, it was not established that the EM fields in 
the brain (generated by synchronously-firing neurons) have a functional role. 
Although the EM field theory of consciousness proposed by Susan Pockett (Pockett 
2000;Pockett 2002) did not propose any functional role for the conscious EM field (it 
remains a ghost in the machine in Pockett’s theory), the cemi field theory proposed a 
feedback loop in which neurons both generated and are affected by EM fields.  
Although in my 2002 papers I amassed a considerable quantity of circumstantial 
evidence indicating that the brain’s EM field affects brain function, the evidence was 
mainly circumstantial. However, key experimental findings since 2002 has firmly 
established a functional role for the brain’s EM fields which I will also review. 
 
1. A functional role for synchrony in the brain 
As described above, by 2002 there was abundant data to indicate that neuronal 
synchrony correlated with attention and awareness in man and animals. On the basis 
of these results many proposals were made for a functional role for synchrony, 
particularly in solving the binding problem whereby distributed parallel processing of 
features in a single object are combined to generate a unified percept. For instance, 
                                                 
1 The CEMI field theory was first outlined in my book “Quantum Evolution” (McFadden 2000), 
though it was there referred to as the conscious electromagnetic field (cem) theory. The 
theory was more fully presented in 2002 as the conscious electromagnetic field theory 
(McFadden 2002a;McFadden 2002b) and has been further elaborated in subsequent 
publications (McFadden 2006;McFadden 2007). 
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the ‘‘binding by synchrony’’ (BBS) theory (von der and Schneider 1986) proposed 
that the neurons representing features of an object are transiently coupled through 
synchronous firing. More recently, Pascal Fries formulated the ‘communication-
through-coherence’ (CTC) hypothesis whereby neural communication between 
neurons was proposed to depend on their degree of synchrony (Fries 2005). In this 
scheme only coherently oscillating (phase-locked) neuronal groups were proposed to 
be capable of communicating effectively because their inputs and outputs are open at 
the same time. A functional role for synchrony in memory has also been proposed 
with neural oscillations either serving a transient store for short term memory and/or 
as a means of forming Hebbian cell assemblies that fire together and thereby wire to 
form long-term memories (Raffone and Wolters 2001). More recently, a functional 
role for gamma and theta oscillations in episodic memory has been proposed whereby 
oscillations allow for the transient interaction between cortical structures and the 
hippocampus for the encoding and retrieval of episodic memories (Nyhus and Curran 
2010).  
Most of the above proposals were made on the basis of observations of correlations 
between neural oscillations and the phenomenon in question (attention, memory, etc.). 
Correlation does not of course prove causation but it is difficult to demonstrate a 
causal role without some means of interfering with neural synchrony. This has been 
achieved in some systems, particularly in insects. For instance, Stopfer et al. (Stopfer 
et al. 1997) uses picrotoxin to disrupt neural synchrony in the honey bee and 
demonstrated that desynchronization of odour-encoding neural assemblies impaired 
the bee’s ability to discriminate different odours. Similar experiments have been 
performed in several other insects, for instance, drosophila (Tanaka et al. 2009), and 
demonstrate that patterns of neuronal oscillations represent particular odours in the 
olfactory bulb and that disruption of these patterns disrupts odour discrimination (Kay 
et al. 2009). 
Disrupting neuronal oscillations without affecting neuron firing rates is more 
difficult in higher animals and man but it is sometimes possible to induce or perturb 
oscillations and observe the effect. For instance, a study from Wolf Singer’s 
laboratory investigated changes of neuronal discharge rates and synchrony in 
anesthetized cats in response to centre and surround gratings of different orientations 
and phase relations such that neural discharge rate and neural synchrony could be 
independently varied (Biederlack et al. 2006). By varying the orientation or the 
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relative spatial phase of the surrounding grating it was possible to change the 
perceived brightness of the centre grating. Brightness enhancement by orientation 
contrast between the centre and surround was associated with an increase of neuron 
discharge rates but not with changes in spike synchronization. In contrast, phase offset 
also caused a perceptual brightness enhancement yet with no change in discharge 
rates but an increase in neural synchronization between neurons responding to the 
centre grating. The study demonstrated that increased neuronal synchronization 
increased perceived brightness independent on any effect on neuronal discharge rates. 
Studies in humans were reported by Bauer et al. in 2009 (Bauer et al. 2009) whose 
subjects were shown a pattern of Gabor patches (sine wave grating) within which they 
had to detect a signal: a subtle change in spatial frequency of one of the patches. Prior 
to arrival of the signal the target or control patches were modified by a inducing a 
subliminal 50 Hz flicker in the patch. Although the subjects could not detect the 
flicker it nevertheless synchronized their neurones at point of the flicker generating 
phase locking of those neurones in the area of the visual cortex that responded to the 
image at the site of flicker. The flicker, though subliminal, was found to significantly 
enhance target detection by the subjects at the site of the flicker. So inducing 
synchronicity appears to have a causal role in directing conscious attention in humans: 
it is not a steam whistle. 
The above results clearly indicate that synchrony per se (independent of neural 
firing rates) plays a functional role in mediating selective attention and awareness in 
the brain of man and animals. Curiously, this role for consciousness was anticipated 
by the psychologist William James writing more than a century ago: “Whoever 
studies consciousness, from any point of view, is ultimately brought up against the 
mystery of selective attention.” James concludes that the function of consciousness is 
to “choose out of the manifold experiences present to it at a given time some one for 
particular accentuation, and to ignore the rest” [(Richardson 2007), page 199]. Of 
course, the significance of studies of selective attention particularly, in (sometimes 
anaesthetized) animals, to the phenomenon of consciousness in humans is 
questionable. However, there is little doubt that consciousness involves some degree 
of selective attention so it is reasonable to conclude that the mechanisms, including 
neural synchrony, that play a role in focussing attention, are also important 
component of consciousness 
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However, the demonstration that synchrony is associated with consciousness 
does not say anything concerning the mechanisms by which synchrony might impact 
the conscious mind. In the following section I discuss evidence that the impact of 
synchrony of consciousness is likely to be due to EM field effects.  
 
1. A functional role for EM fields in the brain 
The first study I will consider comes came from Yuji Ikegaya’s laboratory in Tokyo 
who examined gamma frequency rhythmic activity in rat hippocampal brain slice 
preparations (Fujisawa et al. 2004). The researchers first demonstrated that the brain 
slices exhibited no spontaneous gamma oscillatory activity but gamma oscillations 
could be reliably induced by application of the muscarinic agonist, carbachol and 
detected using extracellular electrodes. The researchers aimed to examine whether the 
EM fields generated by these rhythmic oscillations affected neural firing patterns in 
the tissue. To simulate the intrinsic gamma oscillation they placed parallel electrodes 
above the CA3 pyramidal cells in the (untreated) slice and applied an oscillating 40 
Hz electric field that generated an extracellular field in the tissue with a amplitude and 
waveform similar to those of the carbachol-induced activity. They then stimulated a 
CA3 pyramidal cell (by injection of current) and measured the delay (latency) in the 
neuron’s repose: a spike. In the absence of external field the delay was a latency of 
about 38 ms to obtain the first spike; but in the presence of an external oscillating 
field the initial spike was delayed to about 160 ms which was followed by a more 
sustained rhythmic firing burst. When the imposed field was terminated the spiking 
pattern returned to the control levels. Clearly the external fields were modulating the 
firing pattern of individual neurons. Interestingly the researchers found that the phase 
of the stimulus in relation to the phase of the externally applied field significantly 
affected the latency of the response. The researchers concluded that their experiments 
demonstrate the existence of ‘a novel mode of interneuronal communication mediated 
by local electric field’.  
The next study, from David McCormick’s laboratory at Yale (Frohlich and 
McCormick 2010) examined the influence of fields in whole animals. The group used 
multisite depth electrodes to record local field potentials (LFPs) in the primary visual 
cortex of anaesthetized ferrets. They measured slow oscillations in the endogenous 
electric field (EF) with peak strength of about 2 m V/mm. To examine whether these 
relatively weak field were capable of influencing neural function they applied external 
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sine wave fields with the approximate strength of the weak in vivo EF’s to in vitro 
brain slice preparations of the ferret visual cortex that spontaneously generate a slow 
oscillation. They were able to demonstrate that application of the external field caused 
small membrane depolarizations (about 1mV drop in the transmembrane voltage) in 
individual neurones and that these depolarisations accelerated the neocortical slow 
oscillations in the in vitro slices and made them more periodic: they entrained the 
slow oscillation. To demonstrate that this effect was not peculiar to the particular 
nature of the external sine wave fields they then applied a naturalistic waveform to the 
slices and demonstrated that this was also capable of strongly modulating the 
spontaneous oscillatory activity of the brain tissue; and EFs as weak as 0.25 – 
0.5mV/mm were able to modify network behaviour. These results led the researchers 
to propose that the endogenous EFs provide a positive feed back loop that entrains 
oscillatory networks. To test this hypothesis they calculated the fields generated by 
endogenous oscillations in the slices and then applied external fields that either 
positively or negatively interfered with the predicted endogenous fields. As expected, 
the externally-enhanced positive feedback promoted oscillatory activity whereas the 
externally applied negative feedback suppressed the same activity. Finally, they 
constructed a computer model of a simple neural network and used it to confirm the 
role of endogenous fields in modulating oscillatory activity of the network. The 
researchers concluded that their studies “support a functional role of the endogenous 
field in guiding physiological network activity by feedback interactions in neocortex.” 
Another exciting study was conducted by Christof Koch’s laboratory at the 
California Institute of Technology (Anastassiou et al. 2011). The experimenters 
managed to simultaneously monitor both extracellular and intracellular electric fields 
(EFs) by placing multiple electrodes both within and between pyramidal neurones in 
rat brain slices maintained in vitro. Using one of the electrodes as a source, the 
researchers were able to apply a weak external (to the neurones) EF (of about 
1mV/mm) and (whilst simultaneously blocking synaptic transmission) record both 
extracellular and intracellular EF changes in nearby neurones.  Application of weak 
oscillating external fields (of similar magnitude and frequency as endogenous fields) 
caused measurable changes in the intracellular fields and extracellular EFs and 
thereby shifted the transmembrane potential of adjacent neurones by about 0.5 mV. 
These transmembrane potential perturbations oscillated at the same frequency as the 
externally applied fields. But does this weak induced field affect neural function? To 
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answer this question the experimenters injecting a constant current into the cell body 
of 25 target neurones to induce (2 – 4 Hz) spiking and examined the effect of applying 
an extracellular field on their firing. The applied field did not change the frequency of 
firing but it did affect their phase, causing them to preferentially fire at a preferred 
phase relative to the external field oscillations (in synchrony). Increasing the field 
strength enhanced the phase locking of the spikes to the applied field. The researchers 
concluded that, “Endogenous brain activity can causally affect neural function 
through field effects under physiological conditions”; and that the resulting 
synchronization “may have a substantial effect on neural information processing and 
plasticity”. 
Each of these exciting studies point to a new mode of EM field 
communication between neurones and a neglected feedback loop involving EM fields 
generated by neurone firing influencing the firing of the neurones that generate that 
field. They clearly indicate that endogenous EM field play an important role in 
recruiting neurones into networks of synchronous firing which, as described above, 
are the strongest known correlate of attention and consciousness.  
 
Discussion 
The experimental studies described above clearly demonstrate a functional role for 
both neuron synchronization and the brain’s EM field in creating networks of 
interacting neurons. The results indicate that the brain’s EM field is clearly not an 
epiphenomenon (the brain’s steam whistle), a product of brain function but with no 
influence on its function. These studies are therefore relevant to theories of 
consciousness involving EM fields. Specifically, they are entirely compatible with 
theories which proposed a specific role for an EM field consciousness in modifying 
neural firing patterns (John 2002;McFadden 2006;McFadden 2007;McFadden 
2002b); but it is not clear that they are compatible with alternative theories that 
propose that EM field consciousness is an epiphenomenon with no influence on brain 
function (Pockett 2000;Pockett 2002).  
The pioneering psychologist William James (1842 – 1910) suggested that “if 
consciousness can load the dice, can exert a constant pressure in the right direction, 
can feel what nerve processes are leading to the goal, can reinforce and strengthen 
these & at the same time inhibit those that threaten to lead astray, why, consciousness 
will be of invaluable service” [(Richardson 2007), page 195]. But how can an 
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ephemeral consciousness exert a constant pressure on very physical nerves? The 
experimental studies described in this review provide a mechanism. The endogenous 
EM field generated by neural firing does indeed exert a pressure on neurone firing 
patterns, not influencing their firing rate but influencing their phase so that they fire in 
synchrony. And synchronous firing is a strong (probably the strongest) correlate of 
consciousness. So placing the seat of consciousness in the brain’s electric field 
pushing and pulling on its neural strings delivers James’ “invaluable service” and 
simultaneously accounts for why synchronous firing is so tightly correlated with 
consciousness: it is the product of the action of the brain’s conscious electromagnetic 
field on brain activity. 
 Pascal Fries has proposed the ‘communication through coherence’ hypothesis. 
He first notes that neurons have an innate tendency to oscillate and these oscillations 
constitute fluctuations in excitability, effectively opening and closing a window of 
sensitivity to synaptic input. Therefore, for a sender neuron to communicate 
effectively with a receiver neuron, the sending neuron’s output must arrive at the 
receiver neuron when it is potentially excitable, otherwise the neurons will not 
communicate effectively. This can only happen if the rhythmic opening and closing of 
both neurons’ communication windows are coordinated. This, Fries argues, is the 
purpose of neuronal coherence. It creates flexible groups of neurons that can 
effectively communicate in order to influence downstream motor actions. 
David McCormick has proposed that EM fields serve to recruit neurons into 
oscillatory networks (Frohlich & McCormick 2010). It is a short step from 
McCormick’s scheme to placing the seat of consciousness within the brain’s EM 
field, as in the cemi field theory, and thereby allow consciousness to, via the EM 
field, “exert a constant pressure in the right direction, can feel what nerve processes 
are leading to the goal, can reinforce and strengthen these & at the same time inhibit 
those that threaten to lead astray” and thereby provide the “invaluable service” 
proposed by James. Equating consciousness with a real physical field may initially 
seem an outlandish suggestion but it is in fact no more extraordinary a proposal than 
claiming the commonplace materialist position that consciousness is identical with 
certain configurations of the matter of the brain: its neurones. As Einstein famously 
proved, matter and energy have exactly equivalent ontological status (E = mc2) so 
placing consciousness in the energy field of the brain (the left side of the above 
equation) is no more remarkable than placing the seat of awareness in the matter of 
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the brain (the right side of the equation).  However, as argued in my earlier papers, the 
EM field solution has the huge bonus of effortlessly solving the binding problem. The 
electrical mechanism of neural firing ensures that all the information encoded in the 
neurones of the brain is reflected into the brain’s EM field where it will be unified: 
that is what we mean by a field. From the frame of reference of an electromagnetic 
field there is neither time nor space between any part of an EM field. So the vast 
quantity of information in the EM field of the human brain (surely the most complex 
object in the known universe) has the same level of unity as a single electron or 
photon. It is in this information-rich dimensionless point that, I claim, the seat of our 
experience is located. 
 That the brain’s EM field does influence its function implies that it is subject 
to natural selection. It seems likely that, just as with electrical devices, EM fields are 
more likely to interfere with the action potential-mediated function of nerves than to 
provide a positive influence. Natural selection will thereby act to insulate these neural 
functions from EM field influences. The CEMI field theory claims that unconscious 
brain activity corresponds to these EM field-insulated neural operations.  However, if 
there are brain operations that can benefit from EM field influences (e.g. to generate 
networks of communicating neurons) then natural selection will act on neural function 
to enhance and optimise these interactions between neurones and EM fields. The 
CEMI field theory claims that these brain functions correspond to conscious brain 
activity and the influence of the EM field on neurone firing corresponds to the 
physical realization of our conscious will. The theory thereby claims that the brain 
utilises two forms of neural communication. The first is performed without EM field 
influences and corresponds to our unconscious action. The second involves neuronal 
interaction with the brain’s endogenous EM field and these are experienced as our 
conscious actions.   
 As described above, the initial (and continuing) role provided by EM field for 
brain function may have been to recruit neurons into and out of interacting networks. 
However, additional advantages of EM field interactions may also have been captured 
by natural selection. One possibility suggested in my first 2002 paper (McFadden 
2002a) was that EM fields could be involved in promoting neural plasticity and 
memory. It is well established that Hebbian learning depends on correlated firing 
between pre- and post-synaptic neurones. I proposed in 2002 that such a process could 
be mediated by EM fields that increase the probability of near simultaneous firing in 
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pre- and post-synaptic neurones and thereby increase synaptic strength.  Although this 
conjecture remains unproven, synchronous firing has since been strongly implicated 
in memory (Axmacher et al. 2006;Jensen et al. 2007); so the likely associated EM 
field perturbations are at least implicated by association.   
 Another possible role for EM field proposed in my 2002 paper was the that the 
brain performs field computing, a form of computation that shares many features with 
quantum computation (MacLennan 1999). That artificial selection is able to capture 
field computations has been demonstrated by a remarkable experiment performed by 
the School of Cognitive & Computing Sciences (COGS) group at the University of 
Sussex whose aim was to apply artificial evolution to evolve an electric circuit that 
would perform a particular task: in this case, distinguishing between two musical 
notes (Davidson 1997;Thompson 1996). The group used a silicon chip known as a 
field-programmable gate array (FPGA), comprised of an array of cells. Electronic 
switches distributed through the array allow the behaviour and connections of the 
cells to be software reconfigured. Starting from a population of random 
configurations, the hardware was evolved to perform the task. After about 5,000 
generations the network could efficiently perform its task. When the group examined 
the evolved network they discovered that it utilized only 32 of the 100 FPGA cells. 
The remaining cells could be disconnected from the network without affecting 
performance. However, when the circuit diagram of the critical network was 
examined it was found that some of the essential cells, although apparently necessary 
for network performance (if disconnected, the network failed), were not connected by 
wires to the rest of the circuit! According to the researchers, the most likely 
explanation seems to be that these cells were contributing to the network through 
electromagnetic coupling — field effects — between components in the circuit. 
 It is not yet known what kind of field interactions are responsible for the 
computations performed in the COGS FPGA arrays but it is clear that, if artificial 
natural selection can capture EM field effects, then natural selection, acting over 
millions of years, will similarly capture and hone any advantage provided by 
processing information between neurones via EM fields. I suggest that advantage was 
captured at some crucial stage of human evolution and provided our ancestors 
conscious minds. 
 In conclusion, a decade on, the CEMI field theory remains the most firmly 
grounded scientific theory of consciousness. It is based on established 
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neurophysiology, requires neither new physics nor infeasible physical states in the 
brain, accounts for the best known correlate of consciousness, solves the binding 
problem and provides a novel framework to understanding the role of consciousness 
in minds.  
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
The northern leopard frog in its natural setting near the Maligne River in Jasper 
National Park, Alberta, Canada. Its natural camouflage helps it blend into its 
surroundings (picture, Kurt Fitzner).  
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